Category Archives: Classical Pedagogy

“All Men Desire to Know” (2)

In light of the introductory post to this series, I will here engage with the first of the three questions I posed. Arising directly from Aristotle’s discussion of the topic that all human beings desire by nature to know, the question I posed is: What content do all men by nature want to know?

The importance of this question – along with the fact that I have rarely ever seen any classical educator either pose it or significantly engage with it – has been pressed home to me for some years by the weight of much less-than-stellar pedagogical experiences in real classical schools in real classrooms with real students really engaging with classical materials. Multiple complex factors converge, of course, and there is surely plenty of “blame” to spread around in evaluating the implications of such negative experiences, but it is not my purpose to do so here. 

Rather, having acknowledged the backdrop of a great variance between the overly rosy picture one tends to get from classical education promotional materials and the actual experiences of classroom teachers, I want to approach the problem by drawing from Aristotle’s dictum and asking, What content do all men by nature want to know?  

Being a good classicist, knowing my rhetoric, I begin by saying that a division of the matter is critical for clarity.  In my judgment, dividing the question into parts in reverse order of the terms is the best way to proceed. Thus, to begin, what does it mean, precisely, to say that human beings “want to know”?

Though I’m talking Aristotle, allow me to borrow from Socrates, who presciently argued many times that a want is based on a lack, and that no one goes looking for what he already has. If you want something, it’s because you don’t have it. If you don’t want something, it’s because you do have it. Simple enough, right?

But let’s not let apparent simplicity divert us from examination, for already, even with so simple an observation we have stumbled upon a gold mine of principles and applications. For the Philosopher plainly says that “an indication” of the truth of his principle is “the delight we take in our senses,” most particularly sight. For sight “brings to light many differences between things.” Sight, that is, generates knowledge of distinctiveness, and, though Aristotle does not say it in so many words, knowledge of distinctiveness can provoke desire

Consider, if you will, that with respect to sight, wants can arise from recognizing something lacking in oneself that seems to be present in the object of sight.  Now consider, if you will, the radical notion (at least to our jaded era) that not all wants are created equal. A want is not good simply because it is, nor is a thing wanted good simply because it is wanted, nor has good been achieved merely because a thing wanted has been obtained. 

At every stage of this human wanting to know, then, we must beware of what Eve (and Pandora) discovered to the great detriment of all. Some things appear beautiful but aren’t, and immoderate or disordered wants have the power to ruin entire lives.

To bring this seemingly abstract discourse around to education, let’s go with Aristotle as he tells us that the major difference between animals and humans, both of whom have the sensation of sight, consists in the fact that “The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings.”

Now art and reasonings is just code for what makes the Liberal Arts even possible: the ability of the human mind to make judgments about the objects of sensory experience (especially sight). Unlike (mere) animals, the human animal (made in the image of God) doesn’t only perceive differences between things, but also discriminates between them, retaining and then drawing upon “connected experience” in order to advance in actual knowledge of the world.

This discrimination and reflection upon connected experiences gives rise to the arts, or skills, each of which in a particular domain sees and judges and organizes and extends human understanding such that again, unlike the (mere) animals, we do not only have our first and most rudimentary perceptions to live by. We have more: the considered reflections of active reason, plumbing the depths of cause-and-effect, searching out connections, rejecting fallacies, creating by the power art – what Dante called “God’s grandchild,” born of human subcreative work on created Nature – real bodies of insight into the world and human life in it.

(This is, by the way, why the adjective Liberal, Free, has been historically paired with the noun Arts: these bodies of insight into the world and human life in it are precisely the sorts of things that free the human being from mere brutish perceptions and reactions to those perceptions. By implication, there are also Servile, Slavish, arts that may, if not ordered to Virtue, aggrandize rather than civilize mere brutish perceptions.)

Aristotle goes on: “But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not.” Here we see (!) the elementary distinction between people who just experience the world (like animals) and people who pursue arts and reasonings in order to “know the cause” of what they observe.

The distinction is critical for what it is we as classical educators should be expecting to occur in our real schools in real classrooms with real students. Of course – a thousand times of course! – we should treat all students as equal in legal status, in human dignity, in educational opportunity. No student should be a priori written off as undeserving of our best efforts at all times to ennoble and inspire toward a higher, non-brutish mode of living.  As the Declaration of Independence puts it of all human beings, “We hold these truths to be self-evident…”

“All men want to know.” Nevertheless, acknowledging the equal legal status, human dignity, and entitlement to educational opportunity of all does not in any way entail romantic idealisms about either ongoing progress or eventual outcomes. If a portrait of a classical education program looks too good to be true, it likely is too good to be true. If it’s pushing off criticisms of its current state by appealing to an epic vision of a future state, it’s resisting the call to lasting Wisdom and preferring changing mundanities. Sight is our primary sense, says Aristotle, the one that brings us the most delight. But that is precisely why we should not take it for granted. 

Just as we can lead a horse to water, we can make a student decline a Latin noun, parse a Greek verb, sit around a Harkness table trading “What it means to me” first impressions about Herodotus’ Histories, answer comprehension questions on Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, write a progymnasmata on the friendship of Gilgamesh and Enkidu, memorize the first ten lines of Fitzgerald’s translation of The Aeneid, and expound a 20-page senior thesis on what the Biblical Worldview has to say about tattoos, and not one bit of any of it may ever constitute real knowledge, let alone a “classical education.”

“All men want to know.”  But want isn’t a neutral category, for it is already pregnant with a complex array of anthropological and epistemological and ethical habits that may be undermining all the work being done as fast as it can be done. (In this connection, wants might be thought of as Jesus’ types of ground in the parable of the sower – a metaphor no classical educator should imagine he has ever adequately grasped and applied to its fullest.)

“All men want to know.” But if Aristotle is correct – and he just simply is – that the human animal can live like a mere animal, subsisting on “appearances and memories, and hav[ing] but little of connected experience,” it simply does follow that not all students “want by nature to know” in precisely the same way – which means that no classical / Liberal Arts education worthy of the name ought ever to portray itself as “for everyone” in precisely the same way.

“All men want to know.”  Indeed, but there are frequently worlds of difference wrapped up in that seemingly simple word want. As classical educators, we should be far more invested than we are (as a rule) in discerning and disciplining not only the wants of our students, but of ourselves as well. Before we can even discuss what we want to know – a discussion that easily draws our minds to curriculum and lesson plans and grades and classroom management skills and the like – we first need to ponder for a while the very nature of this want that directs the phrase “want to know.”

For if we do not want the right things, we will go looking for the wrong ones to supply the lack implied by the want – and to sort of fuse a bit of Socrates with a bit of Dante, on a misbegotten quest like that, we will invariably find that desire isn’t only the root of every good thing in life, but also of every evil thing.

In the next installment, I’ll move further back in the question What contentdo all men by nature want to know? by focusing on the phrase “by nature.”

“All Men Desire to Know” (1)

Aristotle opens his Metaphysics with the famous line, “All men by nature desire to know.” What better teleological hope could a classical educator adopt than this? Of course, we will adopt it in the context of the necessary confession that ultimately, all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Christ (Col. 2:3) – but still, in terms of what kind of creature the human being is, surely Aristotle the pagan has precisely hit the God-made nail with the God-made hammer. All human beings by nature desire to know.”

But several important questions immediately arise, not just for specifically classical educators, but for anyone, really, pursuing education in the mode of the the Liberal Arts (whether the old or modern idea of such).

First, arising directly from Aristotle’s discussion, what content do all men by nature want to know?

Second, also arising from that milieu, what does it mean and entail to say that they by nature want to know content?

And third, arising directly from the fact that contemporary classical / Liberal Arts education is being done within the vastly different cultural context of an aspiration for universal literacy driving the production of a public mass culture, who exactly should be expected to thoroughly profit from exposure to such an education?

Allow me to briefly (I hope!) expand on each of these questions in subsequent entries.

Classical Education and “Optimism”

The world of classical education today lives within a curious dialectic. One major reason many embrace it is because they are deeply pessimistic about other kinds of education, even to the point, often, of believing other kinds to be lost causes. Yet having embraced classical education, many of the same people swing wildly over to boundless optimism about not just the enterprise of classical education as they are experiencing it, but about that enterprise’s prospects for the future. And having swung over to boundless optimism, they tend to be quite miffed when a less bouyant view comes around.

It’s understandable, of course, that gadflies and jeremiads tend to be looked on with disfavor. Part of this is just Americanitas – in the “land of the free, home of the brave,” which is, of course, “the greatest country on earth,” the ethos of exceptionalism is nearly a religion all its own, powerfully urging everyone to perpetually look on the bright side. People who come around dressed in shabby Socrates costumes and raining on the parade do seem rather pretentious. No one likes a party-pooper.

But there is often a theological aspect to the dialectic, too. In Christian circles, an appreciable percentage of advocacy of classical education coincides with acceptance of an eschatological triumphalism. On this view, since in and through Christ’s victory on the cross we are redemptively moving forward, aiming at the new creation, there’s little room for anything but exultant calls to laugh long, deep belly-laughs and sing and dance and feast and thank God for how splendidly we’re getting along rebuilding, in just a few short decades, the ruins of the ages.

The irony is pretty thick.

Consider that the classical education movement itself was born from Evangelical naysaying about the then-current educational situation. Had there been no annoying gadflies buzzing “Dorothy Sayers! The Trivium! The biblical worldview! Culture war! Fight! Win!” in the ears of practically anyone who would listen, the movement itself would never have gotten started. Sayers’ essay is quite pessimistic (!) about the prospects of her proposed reforms ever being implemented, and indeed, it took almost half a century for anyone of sufficient personal charisma to be able to launch a successful movement based on them.

Consider, more importantly, that many of the primary sources, both pagan and Christian, used in classical education, are far from optimistic about the situations and people they address. Whether Socrates’ frequent criticism of the masses (that’s you and me and all our friends!) as not only uneducated, but unwilling to expose themselves to true education, or Thucydides’ conviction that the evils of the Peloponnesian War function as patterns for all future human conflicts, or Aristotle’s belief that history proceeds serially through advance-fall-advance-fall, etc., or the severe difficulties with one’s own soul that Stoic ethical treatises reveal, or Augustine’s studied ambiguity about the prospects of all attempts, even Christian, to create a just social order, or the almost monotonously repetitive Medieval theme of radical contemptus mundi based on frequently repeated biblical demands to focus not on this-worldly success but on the eternal,it is very difficult to escape the overwhelmingly negativetenor of most of the primary sources used in classical education curricula.

But again, despite this essentially “dark” orientation of the sources themselves, the classical education movement is full of people who treat criticism directed at ideas and practices they advocate – presumably on the basis of the sources – as somehow out of bounds. The classical sources abound in warnings against taking appearances for realities, yet what is the not-so-subtly proud messianism of our self-talk in classical education circles if not the most gigantic appearance of all when set next to the sources we claim as our inspiration?

The classical sources assume the world as a given that is knowable by everyone who bothers to look at it, and the world they show us is quite the same sort of thing as our own. The classical authors act as if they are substantively engaging with that world when they say that wisdom is always right in front of us but we more often than not fail to see it because we prefer our own prejudices instead. Both pagan and Christian, they posit a universal human condition under heaven that they are channeling in order to pass down enduringly valid observations and or prescriptions.

At times, it is true, classical authors overmagnify the truth-value of things said by “the fathers,” as if things are true because they are old. (The Medievals, for all the many good things they do have to teach us, are pretty bad in just that way.) But it is worth asking whether we advance upon them by instead overmagnifying the truth-value of things said by ourselves, when we who are but of yesterday have scarcely begun to be tested against the standards of books we claim are more valuable because they have passed the test of millennia.

Please do not take these remarks as an assault on optimism per se. There is a legitimate, healthy, and holy place for optimism – when optimism is equivalent to “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,” i.e., faith. But even biblical faith is neither a leap in the dark nor an exaggeration of short term achievements. It is, rather a virtue firmly rooted in verifiable human experiences of the world-as-the-world even as it points us beyond the world. It is not faith to act as if, “optimistically speaking” we are already pretty far down the road toward the world-as-it-will-be. Faith is not presumption.

A current leader in the classical movement, has claimed that the problem with giving a classical education today is that none of us ever received that thing ourselves. If that is true (and it is), should not we take greater care with slinging our optimism about? Herodotus was, of course, correct when he put into the Persian royal advisor Artabanus’ mouth, “God always loves to cut down those who…think big thoughts.” And while we’re on Herodotus, remember Croesus of Lydia the next time you’re tempted to enthuse about how earth-shaking, mind-blowing, culture-illuminating, and kingdom-of-God-advancing your own thoughts about and practice of “classical” education really are. Look to the end, which you don’t and can’t know, and you’ll see why unalloyed cheerfulness may just be a species of self-delusion, not wisdom.

That “Silly” Old Gilgamesh

Recently, my daughters read a set of history stories put out by a classical education publisher. Driven by the old pietistic Evangelical cardboard-cutout plot of “Everything-Done-And-Said-For-Spiritual-Purpose-of-Evangelizing-Lost-Character,” the chapters walk said unbeliever through the course of history, exposing the manifold follies of unbelieving worldviews by “simply” setting them side-by-side with the Bible and laughing at the divergences, as if their mere existence proves the veracity of the Christian view. As I paged through the book, marketed to adolescent readers, I cringed more than once at the obvious fact that the authors apparently really do believe that the cardboard cutout theology-apologetics they present to young people is totally compatible with the best aims, methods, and academic goals of classical Christian education.

Among the troublesome remarks made in this book published as part of a “classical” education reading diet there occurred a description of the adolescent Christian main character’s view that the Epic of Gilgamesh is a rather “silly” book. We might expect such an opinion from an adolescent, since at that age the very faculty of judgment is still developing along with the brain. But it was an adult classical educator who wrote the book, so I suppose we ought to be scratching our heads wondering what’s going on. Gilgamesh a “silly” book? Whatever else it might be called, “silly” should never be among the choices. Allow me to explain why.

Imagine a world literally (!) and biblically (!) like the one that the opening words of Genesis 6 describe:

Now it came to pass, when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and daughters were born to them, that the sons of God saw the daughters of men, that they were beautiful, and they took wives for themselves of all whom they chose…There were giants on the earth in those days and also afterward, when the sons of God came in to the daughters of men and they bore children to them. Those were the mighty men who were of old, men of renown. (1-4)

It is well-known that Christians don’t agree on the identity of these “sons of God” (some see them as human scions of the godly line of Seth, here doing evil things; others as fallen angels who took on bodies, here doing evil things), but one thing is crystal-clear: the union of these sons with these daughters produced giants, “the mighty men who were of old, men of renown.” We’re surely not too far off the mark in saying that the products of these marriages seem to be a good bit like what mythology calls “demigods.” And that leads us to the realization that, lo and behold, Gilgamesh, King of Uruk, happens to be a demigod (2/3 god, 1/3 man) of gigantic dimensions: “A triple cubit was his foot, half a rod his leg. Six cubits was his stride…” (I.56)

This already, from the opening lines of the Epic, should be enough not only to arrest our attention but to render forever null and void any adolescent judgment that this is going to be a “silly” book. We may have here, rather, the earliest piece of surviving human literature describing the adventures of one of the Nephilim in lands still then under the yoke of demonic overlords (cf. “the Prince of Persia,” Dan. 10). And when we realize that, putting our best guess to dates, a real Gilgamesh would have preceded Father Abraham by only 500 years, and the latter may well have grown up hearing about the hunt for Humbaba, the tragic death of Enkidu, and the quest for Uta-na-pishtim, we might well feel a stronger connection to Abraham than before. Moreover, as people who believe in a book full of angelic appearances and miracles, we ought to be more disposed to find the basic story line of Gilgamesh plausible, not less.

I would like to present you a more properly classical way to view the Epic of Gilgamesh, a way that doesn’t approach it first as the product of a heathen mind (followed by a childish indulgence in laughter, as if we, given all we have by grace alone, are somehow better than they), but as the product of a human mind, a mind which, though darkened in many ways by sin, yet retains enough God-given light to come to many true conclusions about God’s world.

For one, the Epic of Gilgamesh raises profound questions about the roots of, and even the value of, civilization. Like most important cities in the Ancient world, Uruk was founded with a divine imprimatur, in this case, under the direct oversight of a demigod. Yet this divine imprimatur does not include an inherent ethical component, let alone a foundation encouraging political wisdom. Gilgamesh, a literal giant of a man, is a moral pygmy when we first meet him, tyrannizing his people, stealing brides right and left, and well exemplifying the adage “Might makes right.” It is an all-too common pattern in human history, broken only here and there prior to Christianity (by the Greeks and the Romans, for instance), and since the very first city ever was founded by a fratricide, Cain, we might do well to stop and ponder whether there is just something about fallen city living that leaves much to be desired. Cities solve many problems by centralizing power and the means of production, but it is precisely these great strengths that can easily become great weaknesses that radically affect thousands or millions. Maybe the quiet, peaceful, “in touch with nature” life of the herdsman in Gilgamesh is better? It was Abel’s “natural” sacrifice that God accepted, not Cain’s “technological” one. Gilgamesh offers us a chance to ponder such deep and abiding questions about what it means to be human.

For another thing, the early physical clash of Gilgamesh and Enkidu may be seen as symbolically representing the moral clash of the corruption of fallen city life with behavioral norms that are so connected to the natural order that even one who comes from the beasts simply knows them to be true. Here, even the cult prostitution angle provides some light. Ancient divinized politics did often have a literal sexual dimension, in which union with the female cult symbol represented participation in the divine order of the cosmos. But at the same time, in Gilgamesh it takes the prostitute to “civilize” nature, and the moment nature becomes “civilized,” it loses something wild and free that it once had. At the same time, the prostitute fails to incorporate Enkidu into the corrupt politics of Uruk, for the first thing he does on arriving in town is find and combat Gilgamesh at the door of a bride the latter is trying to steal. In our own time, when too many people simply feel no shame restraining them from all manner of actions traditionally deemed evil, and when too many profess no longer to be able to rationally tell such simple things as who belongs in what bathroom, it is somewhat refreshing, not to mention provocative, to read an old pagan book asserting the knowability and universality of natural moral norms. And on the other side, it may be worth asking what sorts of “seductive” effects civilization has on its adherents. Are we entirely sure it is good to live in cities and be shaped from cradle to grave by their incessant hustle-bustle, pluralism, and commercialism?

For a third thing, pagan or not, the book contains two major invocations of the hardwired limitations of mortals under God, particularly with respect to limitation of lifespan, and with these two it doubly underscores the duty of mortals under God to accept their limited lot and strive to do right until the end. The end of the epic is ambiguous as to how Gilgamesh lives when he returns home, but it is difficult not to surmise from the repetition of the opening phrases about the dimensions and wonders of Uruk that the hero has come to terms with his mortality and limited-ness, given up on his distorting quest for god-like honor and glory, and so, hopefully, set out to be a better, more humane sort of ruler. Speculation, yes, but warranted by how much Enkidu changes him and how deeply his abject failure to attain what only gods can have affected his disposition.

These are only three points of a number that could be raised. I think they are enough to show that the quality judgment on Gilgamesh given by the adolescent character I mentioned at the outset ought to be taken with a grain of salt. It might be true that we could get some laughs out of it here and there, particularly when Gilgamesh calls the depraved goddess Ishtar a simple whore who kills all her lovers and when Enkidu throws a bloody haunch of the Bull of Heaven at her. But to baldly judge it a “silly” book? Does such a sloppy judgment even need refuting? And more to the point, should classical educators, who of all types of educators ought to be characterized by modesty of judgment born of a growing sense of knowing-that-they-don’t-know, be writing superficial twaddle like that in the first place? Are we trying to make our children good interpreters of wide swaths of God’s world, or just self-important cynics laughing at all that doesn’t immediately “click” into place in their own current experiences?

What Do We Read These Old Books For, Anyway?

One thing that has come to concern me in my years as a classical educator is what I see as a widespread type of intellectual emasculation of the classical texts in our circles.

What I mean is the phenomenon of reading the classical books as materials for practicing polemical defenses of what we already believe on other grounds, and have no intention of letting old books question. It’s a curious sort of attitude, since our movement loves to cite Lewis’ remark in his preface to Athanasius’ On the Incarnation. There, Lewis expounds the problem with reading only recent books as the fact that they sound right to us because we inhabit the same cultural space as them: they ask only the questions we ourselves already ask, and so they come to the sorts of answers we ourselves are already predisposed to come to – and we are so easily amazed at how wise others who think just like us prove we are. Conversely, says Lewis, the value of reading really old books is that they don’t share our prejudices, don’t ask the same questions we are asking, and so are not likely to have gone astray in the exact ways we ourselves are most likely going astray – but find it difficult to see when reading only books inside our echo chamber.

Many in our movement love to cite this Lewis quote, but the real impact of it seems yet to have hit a lot us squarely in the face, to wit: as mostly unskilled (though we’re working on that) readers of the classical texts, we don’t already know, and that’s the main reason why we’re reading the classical texts in the first place. We’re already thoroughly familiar with our own time’s way of thinking about politics, economics, war, education, art, music, and so on. What we’re reading the classics for is to find out what we might be missing by ONLY being super-familiar with the insides of our own heads.

Or at least, that’s what we should be reading the classics for. It is my distinct impression that far too many of us are reading the classics for very different reasons than the one they themselves were written for, the acquisition of wisdom. It would be tedious to drag out direct quotes from classical movement authors showing this phenomenon, so instead, I’ll be devoting this space to combating it positively – by trying to show ways in which even we Christians can profit from the classical texts by trying to discern in them the wisdom God often granted even to those who denied Him.